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Torts
Pamela A. Wilkins
The Georgia Supreme Court’s torts decisions of the June 1, 2020,
through May 31, 2021, survey period ran the gamut. 1 Dog bite liability?
Check. Proximate cause? Check. Negligent misrepresentation by a sperm
bank? Alas, check. And apportionment of fault? Check, check, check.
Two themes emerge from the cases of the past term. First, in the
apportionment setting, one sees the court’s commitment to textualism
and its readiness to interpret Georgia’s apportionment statutes as
abrogating longstanding common-law doctrines. Second—and, not
surprisingly, this is most apparent in the court’s business torts
jurisprudence—one sees a deference to business interests: this is a
business-friendly court. Of course, many cases fall outside either of these
themes.
But enough summary. Let’s dive in.
I. APPORTIONMENT CASES
In its 2020–2021 term, the Georgia Supreme Court continued to
wrestle with questions regarding apportionment of damages. In its three
major apportionment cases, the court also proved willing to interpret
Georgia’s apportionment statutes broadly and to find the statute
abrogates many well-established common-law doctrines recognized in
Georgia’s decisional law.
A. Apportionment in Strict Products Liability Cases: Johns v. Suzuki
Motor of America, Inc.
In the first of the three apportionment cases, the Georgia Supreme
Court held in Johns v. Suzuki Motor of America, Inc,2 that the plain


Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Associate Professor of Law, Mercer University
School of Law. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (A.B. 1989); University of South
Carolina School of Law (J.D. 1993).
1. For an analysis of last year’s torts law during the prior Survey period, see Jarome
E. Gautreaux, Torts, 72 MERCER L. REV. 299 (2020).
2. 310 Ga. 159, 850 S.E.2d 59 (2020).
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language of Official Code of Georgia Annotated section 51-12-33(a)3
requires apportionment of damages in strict products liability cases. 4 In
other words, principles of comparative fault apply to products liability
actions: under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33, juries must apportion fault between
defendants whose products are defective and plaintiffs whose fault
contributed to their injuries.5
In Johns, the plaintiff suffered serious injuries when the front brake
on his Suzuki motorcycle suddenly failed.6 He sued the manufacturer and
its American distributor7 alleging both a design defect and negligence.8
Specifically, he alleged that a defect in the front master brake cylinder
resulted in a misdirected flow of brake fluid that ultimately caused the
motorcycle’s sudden brake failure. However, the plaintiff also admitted
that he had never changed the brake fluid in the motorcycle, despite his
having owned it for eight years and despite instructions in the owner’s
manual to replace the brake fluid every two years.9
The jury agreed the brakes were defective but also found the plaintiff
49% at fault. Accordingly, the trial court reduced his recovery. The
plaintiff appealed on the ground that because his claim was based on
strict products liability, damages should not have been reduced based on
apportionment of fault under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33. The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court’s ruling on apportionment, and the plaintiff
appealed.10
In affirming the decision of the court of appeals, the Georgia Supreme
Court relied on a plain meaning interpretation of Georgia’s
apportionment statute.11 O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(a), which was enacted in
2005, provides that:
Where an action is brought against one or more persons for injury to
person or property and the plaintiff is to some degree responsible for
the injury or damages claimed, the trier of fact, in its determination of
the total amount of damages to be awarded, if any, shall determine the

3. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(a) (2005).
4. Johns, 310 Ga. at 159, 850 S.E.2d at 60.
5. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33.
6. Id. at 159, 850 S.E.2d at 60–61.
7. His wife brought a separate claim for loss of consortium. Id. at 159, 850 S.E.2d at
61. However, that claim is not relevant here.
8. The negligence claims were not relevant to the court’s holding. Additionally, the
parties raised various other arguments, none of which were relevant to the court’s ruling
on apportionment. Id. at 161, 850 S.E.2d at 62 n.2 (describing other claims and arguments).
9. Id. at 161, 850 S.E.2d at 61.
10. Id. at 161, 850 S.E.2d at 61–62.
11. Id. at 161, 850 S.E.2d at 61–62.
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percentage of fault of the plaintiff and the judge shall reduce the
amount of damages otherwise awarded to the plaintiff in proportion to
his or her percentage of fault.12

The core of the court’s reasoning was simple. A products liability action
is necessarily one for “injury to person,” and the apportionment statute
does not limit the kinds of actions to which it applies. 13 Although the
court had once referred to the statute as “codifying the doctrine of
comparative negligence,” nothing in the statute limits its application to
classic negligence cases.14 Accordingly, the court concluded that a “strict
products liability claim falls comfortably within the statute’s textual
ambit.”15
In so ruling, the supreme court held that Georgia’s broad
apportionment statute supplants both prior state decisional law and a
longstanding common law rule barring use of a plaintiff’s negligence as
a defense in a products liability action. 16 Within Georgia, a long line of
court of appeals and supreme court precedent—including some precedent
post-dating an earlier iteration of Georgia’s apportionment statute—held
that strict products liability claims are not subject to apportionment
based on a plaintiff’s potential fault. 17 However, the court disregarded
these cases because: (i) they pre-dated the current apportionment
statute;18 (ii) the current apportionment statute under which the cases
were decided is materially different from Georgia’s prior apportionment
statute;19 and (iii) decisions post-dating either iteration of the
apportionment statute generally had not considered the effect of the
statute.20
Similarly, although the Georgia Supreme Court acknowledged the
longstanding common law rule that a plaintiff’s negligence cannot be a
defense in a products liability case, 21 it held the statute abrogated the

12. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(a) (2021).
13. Johns, 310 Ga. at 166–67, 850 S.E.2d at 65.
14. Id. at 162, 850 S.E.2d at 62 (quoting Zaldivar v. Prickett, 279 Ga. 589, 589, 774
S.E.2d 688, 693 (2015)).
15. Id. at 162, 850 S.E.2d at 62.
16. Id. at 163–64, 850 S.E.2d at 63–64.
17. Id. at 163, 850 S.E.2d at 63.
18. Id. at 164, 850 S.E.2d 63–64.
19. Id. at 165, 850 S.E.2d at 64 n.6.
20. Id. at 166, 850 S.E.2d at 64–65 (discussing Hernandez v. Crown Equip. Co., 649
Fed. App’x. 726 (11th Cir. 2016)).
21. Id. at 163, 850 S.E.2d at 63 (citing Georgia cases relying on the Restatement rule
that contributory negligence is not a defense to strict products liability).
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common law rule.22 The court also observed that products liability law
initially developed when most jurisdictions still recognized the doctrine
of contributory negligence, under which a plaintiff’s negligence, however
slight, would have been a total bar to recovery.23 Barring products
liability defendants from asserting a plaintiff’s negligence makes far
more sense in the contributory negligence setting than in the
comparative negligence setting. And as the court pointed out, the drafters
of the Third Restatement recognized that “a strong majority of
jurisdictions apply the comparative responsibility doctrine to products
liability actions.”24
The ruling in Johns was no surprise. The supreme court had already
interpreted the apportionment statute broadly and in derogation of a
common law rule by allowing for apportionment in cases involving
intentional torts.25 Litigants should continue to expect broad
interpretations of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33.
B. Apportionment and Notice of Non-Party Defendants in Respondeat
Superior Actions: Atlanta Women’s Specialists, LLC v. Trabue
In the second case construing O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33, the court in Atlanta
Women’s Specialists, LLC v. Trabue26 held that Georgia’s apportionment
statute requires a defendant to file notice of non-party fault when the
defendant “wants to reduce a potential damages award against him by
having the jury apportion damages between him and his defendant
employer based on an assessment of the fault of a nonparty coemployee.”27
This consolidated case involved medical malpractice.28 The plaintiff
sued Atlanta Women’s Specialists (AWS) as well as a physician who was
an AWS employee (the defendant physician). The plaintiff did not allege
independent negligence by AWS but did allege negligence by the
defendant physician and a non-party physician also employed by AWS.
The plaintiff sought recovery against AWS on the basis of vicarious
liability. At the close of evidence, defense counsel, who represented both

22. Id. at 164-65, 850 S.E.2d at 63–64. “There is no question that statutes can displace
decisional law.” Id.
23. Id. at 170, 850 S.E.2d at 67 n.9.
24. Id. at 170, 850 S.E.2d at 67 n.9 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 17 cmt.
a.).
25. See Couch v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 291 Ga. 359, 729 S.E.2d 378 (2012).
26. 310 Ga. 331, 850 S.E.2d 748 (2020).
27. Id. at 339, 850 S.E.2d at 755. The court also ruled on a procedural issue not directly
relevant to the development of tort law in Georgia. Id. at 332–33, 850 S.E.2d at 751–52.
28. Id. at 331–32, 850 S.E.2d at 751.
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AWS and the defendant physician, asked the trial court to apportion
damages between the defendant physician and AWS based on the
percentages of fault of the defendant physician and the non-party
physician. The trial court refused, finding that the defendants had not
provided advance notice, as required by O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(d),29 of their
contention that the non-party physician was wholly or partially at fault.
However, after the verdict, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion
for a new trial on the apportionment issue, accepting the defendants’
contention that the trial court should have required the jury to assess the
relative percentages of fault of the defendant physician and the non-party
physician. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling
on apportionment, finding, inter alia, that the apportionment statute
required the defendants to provide advance notice of non-party fault in
vicarious liability cases.30
The Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals and
relied closely on the text of the apportionment statute. It first noted that
the statute distinguishes between liability and fault and that a non-party
can be at fault but cannot be liable. 31 It next determined that
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b) did not apply.32 That section, which requires
fault-based apportionment among liable parties, did not apply because it
does not concern non-parties like the non-party physician.33 Instead,
subsection (d), which concerns allocation of non-party fault, would
apply.34 Because the defendant physician wished to have the jury
apportion fault between himself and the non-party physician, subsection
(d)’s notice provisions would apply before the jury would be permitted to
apportion fault.35 The defendant physician had not provided notice that
the non-party physician was at fault, so he was not entitled to have the
jury apportion fault between himself and the non-party physician
(liability for which ultimately would pass on to AWS).36
In dissent, Justice Bethel agreed that, absent notice, the jury could not
apportion fault between the defendant physician and the non-party
29. O.C.G.A § 51-12-33(d) (2005).
30. Id. at 333, 850 S.E.2d at 752 (describing ruling by Georgia Court of Appeals).
31. Id. at 339–40, 850 S.E.2d at 755–56.
32. Id. at 339, 850 S.E.2d at 755.
33. Id. at 340, 850 S.E.2d at 756.
34. Id. at 341, 850 S.E.2d at 756.
35. Id. at 343, 850 S.E.2d at 758.
36. Id. at 342, 850 S.E.2d at 758. Because vicarious liability (of whichever physician)
was the sole ground for AWS’s liability, the court first assumed without deciding that
imputed negligence based on respondeat superior was subject “to fault-based
apportionment . . . when the negligent acts of more than one employee are at issue.” Id. at
342, 850 S.E.2d at 757 n.6.
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physician.37 However, the dissent noted that AWS was a named party
and that the non-party physician’s fault was imputed to AWS under the
doctrine of respondeat superior.38 Differently put, Justice Bethel
determined that AWS was itself at fault through the fault of the nonparty physician and that, therefore, the jury could apportion fault
between AWS and the defendant physician.39 Finally, Justice Bethel
determined there was no statutory prohibition on apportioning fault
between AWS and the defendant physician. 40
C. Apportionment and Georgia’s Respondeat Superior Rule: Quynn v.
Hulsey
Finally, in Quynn v. Hulsey,41 the Georgia Supreme Court found that
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 abrogated Georgia’s common law Respondeat
Superior Rule.42 As with the other apportionment cases, the decision
rested largely on a textual analysis of the statute, and especially of the
statutory term “fault.”43
In Quynn, a wrongful death and personal injury case, the plaintiff’s
decedent was struck and killed by a truck owned by a corporation and
driven by an employee of the corporation. The administrator of the
decedent’s estate sued the driver and the corporation, asserting that the
corporation was liable for its employee’s tort under the doctrine of
respondeat superior and that the corporation was independently liable
under theories of negligent entrustment, hiring, training, and
supervision. The trial court granted the corporation summary judgment
on the plaintiff’s independent negligence claims (entrustment, hiring,
etc.) and a claim for punitive damages. After trial, the jury found the
employee and corporation 50% at fault and the decedent 50% at fault,
which meant the plaintiff recovered nothing.44
On appeal, the plaintiff-appellant argued that O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33
requires the finder of fact to consider the fault of the employee and the
fault of the corporation separately and that, therefore, the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment for the corporation on the
independent negligence claims (entrustment, hiring, supervision, etc.).
37. Id. at 342–43, 850 S.E.2d at 757-58 (Bethel, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 343–44, 850 S.E.2d at 758.
39. Id. at 344, 850 S.E.2d at 758.
40. Id. at 344, 850 S.E.2d at 758.
41. 310 Ga. 473, 850 S.E.2d 725 (2020).
42. Id. at 473, 850 S.E.2d at 727.
43. Id. at 475–78, 850 S.E.2d at 728–30 (analyzing statutory term “fault”).
44. Id. at 473–74, 850 S.E.2d at 727 (citing O.C.G.A § 51-12-33(g) (2021) (denying
plaintiff any recovery when plaintiff is at least 50% at fault)).
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Relying on Georgia’s Respondeat Superior Rule, the court of appeals
rejected the plaintiff’s argument.45
Thus, the entire issue before the Georgia Supreme Court concerned
whether the Respondeat Superior Rule could be reconciled with the
language of the apportionment statute. 46 The court of appeals held that
the two could be reconciled, but the Georgia Supreme Court disagreed
and held that the Respondeat Superior Rule, a doctrine in Georgia
decisional law, was abrogated by O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33.47
Understanding the court’s ruling requires familiarity with the
Respondeat Superior Rule. The doctrine of respondeat superior is familiar
to every first-year law student: an employer can be liable for the
negligence of an employee acting within the scope of employment. For
example, Domino’s would be liable for damages from an accident caused
by a negligent delivery person while delivering pizzas. However, many
plaintiffs injured by the actions of a company’s employee seek recovery
from the company based not only on respondeat superior, which requires
proof of the employee’s negligence while working, but also on the
company’s own independent negligence. For example, Domino’s may
have been negligent in hiring or training its drivers. The company might
be liable under either legal theory—respondeat superior or independent
negligence—but in either case, the company would be responsible for the
plaintiff’s damages only once.
Georgia’s Respondeat Superior Rule applies to situations in which a
plaintiff seeks recovery against a company under theories of respondeat
superior and of independent negligence.48 The doctrine provides that:
[I]f a defendant employer concedes that it will be vicariously liable
under the doctrine of respondeat superior if its employee is found
negligent, the employer is entitled to summary judgment on the
plaintiff’s claims for negligent entrustment, hiring, training,
supervision, and retention, unless the plaintiff has also brought a valid
claim for punitive damages against the employer for its own
independent negligence.49

Articulated frequently by the Georgia Court of Appeals but never
formally adopted by the Georgia Supreme Court, the Respondeat
Superior Rule is designed to avoid prejudice to the employer in the eyes

45. Id. at 474, 850 S.E.2d at 727.
46. Id. at 474, 850 S.E.2d at 727.
47. Id. at 482, 850 S.E.2d at 732–33.
48. Id. at 474, 850 S.E.2d at 727.
49. Id. at 474, 850 S.E.2d at 727–28 (quoting Hosp. Auth. of Valdosta v. Fender, 342
Ga. App. 13, 21, 802 S.E.2d 346, 354 (2017)).

250

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

of the jury because “the employer would be liable for the employee’s
negligence under respondeat superior, allowing claims for negligent
entrustment, hiring, [training] and retention would not entitle the
plaintiff to a greater recovery, but would merely serve to prejudice the
employer.”50 Notably, this rationale does not speak directly to the merits
of an independent negligence claim. In Quynn, the trial court relied on
the Respondeat Superior Rule: (i) in its grant of summary judgment to
the defendant; and (ii) in its refusal to allow the jury to separate the fault
of the employee from any independent fault of the company. 51
In determining whether the Respondeat Superior Rule was consistent
with the apportionment statute, the Georgia Supreme Court turned to
the language of the statute.52 It focused specifically on the requirement
that a jury apportioned damages among persons who are liable
“according to the percentage of their fault,” with fault referring to a
“breach of a legal duty that the defendant owes . . . that is a proximate
cause of [the plaintiff’s] injury.”53 It then reasoned that claims for
negligent hiring, entrustment, etc. are based on alleged employer fault,
and fault that is distinct from the employee’s negligence. 54 The court
therefore concluded that the apportionment statute requires
consideration of this distinct fault. 55 Because the Respondeat Superior
Rule would preclude the consideration of the employer’s independent
negligence in the apportionment of fault, the rule is “inconsistent with
the plain language of the apportionment statute” and therefore
abrogated by the statute.56
By so holding, the court rejected several arguments raised by the
company and by the dissenting justice. 57 Among other things, the
majority58 held that:
(1) Evidence of an employer’s independent fault is not automatically
inflammatory or unfairly prejudicial in cases in which the employer

50. Id. at 474, 850 S.E.2d at 728 (quoting MasTec North Am. v. Wilson, 325 Ga. App.
865, 865, 755 S.E.2d 257, 259 (2014)).
51. Id. at 474, 850 S.E.2d at 727.
52. Id. at 481, 850 S.E.2d at 732.
53. Id. at 476–77, 850 S.E.2d at 728–29 (citing O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b)).
54. Id. at 477, 850 S.E.2d at 729.
55. Id. at 477, 850 S.E.2d at 729.
56. Id. at 477, 850 S.E.2d at 729.
57. Id. at 481-82, 850 S.E.2d at 731-32.
58. Id. at 485–86, 850 S.E.2d at 734–35. In my opinion, the strongest point in the
dissent is that other jurisdictions have consistently shown that if you are imputing
employee’s fault to the employer, then you are counting fault twice in imputing fault for
independent negligence. Id.
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concedes that it will be vicariously liable if its employee was
negligent;59
(2) A claim that an employer was negligent is divisible from a claim
that an employee acting in the scope of employment was negligent and,
therefore, both claims are “capable of being assigned percentages of
fault:” “The evidence required to prove the employer was negligent
would not be the same as the evidence required to prove that the
employee was negligent, and so the claims are not duplicative to that
extent.”60 Here, the court clarified the meaning and scope of FDIC v.
Loudermilk.61 Although the dissent relied on Loudermilk to show the
employer’s and employee’s negligence were indivisible,62 the supreme
court held that Loudermilk supports the notion that § 51-12-33
“shifted the paradigm from damages analysis based on injury to
damages analysis based on fault, requiring damages to be apportioned
in cases where separate negligent acts by separate persons combined
to cause a single injury.”63
(3) The state legislature need not have expressed any direct intention
to abrogate the Respondeat Superior Rule. Although § 51-12-33(e)
required express statutory abrogation of any “defenses or immunities
which currently exist,” the court concluded that (a) the Respondeat
Superior Rule is not a defense or immunity, because it does not allow
an employer to avoid liability; and (b) the current existence in the
common law of a rule never adopted by the Georgia Supreme Court is
doubtful.64

As was true in the other apportionment cases, the court relied almost
solely on a plain meaning analysis of the statute and demonstrated a
strong readiness to find the statute abrogated longstanding common-law
doctrines. The court’s conclusions in Quynn and Trabue may be more
plaintiff-friendly than in Johns; the common thread is the court’s broad
reading of the apportionment statute.

59. Id. at 478, 850 S.E.2d at 730 (“The evidence of the employer’s fault is neither
irrelevant nor required to be excluded in all cases as unfairly prejudicial.”).
60. Id. at 479, 850 S.E.2d at 730.
61. Id. at 480, 850 S.E.2d at 731 (citing Loudermilk, 305 Ga. 588, 826 S.E.2d 116
(2019)).
62. Id. at 484, 850 S.E.2d at 734 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 482, 850 S.E.2d at 732 n.7.
64. Id. at 481, 850 S.E.2d at 731–32.
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II. BUSINESS TORTS
Many cases sit at the intersection of tort and contract law, and
business torts frequently fall into this category. This year, business torts
played only a minor role in the Georgia Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. 65
In Global Payments, Inc. v. InComm Financial Services, Inc.,66 the
Georgia Supreme Court clarified the scope of the negligent
misrepresentation tort in the credit and debit card processing setting. 67
The plaintiff was an issuer of pre-paid debit and credit cards (Vanilla
Visa), and the defendant was a financial data payment processor.
Financial data payment processing companies provide merchants with
technology that allows them to accept card payments and communicate
with card networks and issuers. In this particular case, thieves
purchased Vanilla Visa cards, made purchases with the cards, then
initiated counterfeit electronic reversal transactions (requests for
refunds). These reversal transactions were at different merchants from
those where the initial purchases took place. Ultimately, the plaintiff lost
more than $1,500,000 from this scheme.68
The defendant financial data services processor was not part of the
thieves’ fraudulent scheme, but the plaintiff sued the defendant on a
theory of negligent misrepresentation. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant should have known that the reversal transactions
were invalid because, to put it simply, the numbers transmitted as part
of the reversal transactions did not match the numbers submitted
regarding the original purchases.69
The Georgia Supreme Court held that the plaintiff did not state a
claim for negligent misrepresentation under these circumstances, as the
basis for the ruling was simple: the defendant made no false
representation as required by the tort. 70 Its network accurately
communicated data and numbers, and it did not change that data in any

65. A third case, Geico Indemnity Co. v. Whiteside, 311 Ga. 346, 857 S.E.2d 657 (2021),
sat at the intersection of tort and contract law. In Whiteside, the Georgia Supreme Court
answered three certified questions posed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. Id. All of the questions concerned, directly or indirectly, the parameters
of Georgia’s tort claim for bad faith refusal to settle. Id. In my view, the court’s analysis of
the three questions was highly dependent on the specific facts of the certified case, so
Whiteside’s value as part of a survey is quite limited.
66. 308 Ga. 842, 843 S.E.2d 821 (2020).
67. Id. at 842, 843 S.E.2d 822.
68. Id. at 843, 843 S.E.2d at 823.
69. Id. at 842–44, 843 S.E.2d at 822–23.
70. Id. at 845–46, 843 S.E.2d at 824.
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way.71 Under such circumstances, there was no misrepresentation. 72
According to the court, a financial data services processor would only
detect the thieves’ activity by comparing the numbers from the original
transactions with those from the reverse transactions, but the court
determined that the plaintiff did not assert the defendant had any
common law or statutory duty to undertake such a comparison. 73 The
accurate transmission of numbers—even if an examination of those
numbers would show theft—did not constitute misrepresentation. 74 One
questions the future of claims like that raised by the plaintiff: surely the
thieves’ conduct would be foreseeable to financial data service processors,
and surely technology allows for the creation of safeguards against such
thefts. Perhaps negligent misrepresentation is the wrong claim, but one
should expect additional claims in the future.
A second case, Bowden v. The Medical Center, Inc.,75 concerned claims
of both negligent misrepresentation and fraud.76 In Bowden, the Georgia
Supreme Court clarified that a hospital cannot be liable for fraud or
negligent misrepresentation merely because it relies on its
“chargemaster rate” in perfecting hospital liens. 77 This is so even if (a)
most patients pay considerably less than the chargemaster rate, and (b)
the chargemaster rate ultimately is found to be unreasonable. 78 The
court’s conclusion was based on its reading of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-47079 and
§ 44-14-471,80 which concern the procedures for perfecting hospital
liens.81 This ruling provides significant protection to hospitals and far
less to consumers.
III. TORTS GRAB BAG
Finally, the court decided a handful of cases that lack subject matter
companions in the 2020–2021 term.

71. Id. at 845, 843 S.E.2d at 824.
72. Id. at 845, 843 S.E.2d at 824.
73. Id. at 846, 843 S.E.2d at 824–25.
74. Id. at 846, 843 S.E.2d at 825.
75. 309 Ga. 188, 845 S.E.2d 555 (2020).
76. Id. at 188–89, 845 S.E.2d at 557. The case also raised questions about class
certification and a claim under Georgia’s RICO statute, but those issues are beyond the
scope of the torts update. Id. at 189, 845 S.E.2d at 557.
77. Id. at 201–02, 845 S.E.2d at 565.
78. Id. at 201, 845 S.E.2d at 565.
79. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-470 (2021).
80. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-471 (2021).
81. Bowden, 309 Ga. at 200–02, 845 S.E.2d at 564–65.
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A. Scienter and Dog Bite Cases: S&S Towing & Recovery, Ltd. v.
Charnota
The Georgia Supreme Court in S & S Towing & Recovery, Ltd. v.
Charnota82 assessed a question of constitutional law: whether Georgia’s
dog bite statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural due
process protections by creating an irrebuttable presumption that certain
unrestrained dogs are vicious. 83 However, in answering the
constitutional question, the Georgia Supreme Court clarified the ambit
of § 51-2-7,84 Georgia’s “dog bite” liability statute.85
In S & S Towing, the plaintiff was walking his leashed dog when
another dog, which belonged to the defendant, attacked the plaintiff and
his dog seriously injuring the plaintiff and killing his dog. At the time of
the attack, the defendant’s dog had escaped from the defendant’s
property and, in violation of the county code, was not on a leash or
otherwise restrained. The plaintiff sued, claiming, inter alia, that the
defendant was liable under Georgia’s civil dog bite statute.86
The dog bite statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7, provides that:
A person who owns or keeps a vicious or dangerous animal of any kind
and who, by careless management or by allowing the animal to go at
liberty, causes injury to another person who does not provoke the
injury by his own act may be liable in damages to the person so injured.
In proving vicious propensity, it shall be sufficient to show that the
animal was required to be at heel or on a leash by an ordinance . . . and
the said animal was at the time of the occurrence not at heel or on a
leash.87

It was undisputed that, at the time of the incident, the defendant’s dog
was not at heel or on a leash as required by county statute. The defendant
argued that the second sentence of O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 created an
irrebuttable presumption of viciousness and argued that such an
irrebuttable presumption violated the defendant’s right to procedural
due process.88
In deciding the constitutional issue, the court clarified the meaning
and scope of the dog bite statute.89 Tracing the history of the statute, the
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

309 Ga. 117, 844 S.E.2d 730 (2020).
Id. at 118, 844 S.E.2d at 732.
O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 (2021).
S & S Towing, 309 Ga. at 117, 845 S.E.2d at 731.
Id. at 117–18, 844 S.E.2d at 732.
O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 (emphasis added).
Id. at 117–19, 844 S.E.2d at 732–34.
Id. at 117, 844 S.E.2d at 731.
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court noted that its first sentence had existed in various forms since 1863
and that the statute codified the old common law rule regarding dog
bites.90 The common law rule required the plaintiff to show “not only that
an animal was vicious or dangerous, but also that the owner knew this
fact.”91 The scienter requirement—meaning the requirement that the
owner knew of the animal’s vicious propensities—was considered the gist
of the action.92 Moreover, although the statute does not refer directly to
scienter, the court has consistently interpreted the statute to require the
owner’s knowledge.93
The second sentence of the statute was added in 1985.94 The court read
that sentence as abrogating or narrowing the common law rule in one
respect: the second sentence “displaces the common law presumption
that a dog is a harmless species and instead defines such restrained
animals as ‘vicious.’”95 However, this limited displacement of the common
law rule did not extend to the scienter requirement.96 In other words, a
plaintiff must still prove scienter as regards a dog’s vicious propensities.
The court held that a plaintiff may prove scienter either “by showing that
the owner had knowledge of the animal’s vicious propensity as defined
by the common law [sentence one of the statute] or by showing that the
owner knew that the dog was unrestrained at the time of the injury
[sentence two of the statute].”97 Moreover, the plaintiff must prove all
other elements of the statute.98
Upon clarifying that the second sentence of the statute does not
eliminate the common law scienter requirement, the court concluded the
statute did not violate procedural due process. 99 The court held that, at
most, the second sentence created a rebuttable presumption that still
allowed an owner to prove he was unaware his dog was unrestrained or
unleashed in violation of local law. 100 The court further concluded that
the legislature had a rational basis for creating an additional means for
90. Id. at 120–21, 844 S.E.2d at 734.
91. Id. at 121, 844 S.E.2d at 734.
92. Id. at 121, 844 S.E.2d at 734.
93. Id. at 121, 844 S.E.2d at 734 (“[A]lthough . . . [the dog bite statute does not refer to]
the owner’s knowledge of the animal’s vicious or dangerous nature, we have nevertheless
concluded that scienter was carried over from the common law as an essential element of a
claim . . . .”). Id. at 121, 844 S.E.2d at 734.
94. Id. at 121, 844 S.E.2d at 734.
95. Id. at 121–22, 844 S.E.2d at 734.
96. Id. at 122, 844 S.E.2d at 734–35.
97. Id. at 122, 844 S.E.2d at 734–35.
98. Id. at 122, 844 S.E.2d at 735.
99. Id. at 122, 844 S.E.2d at 735.
100. Id. at 122–23, 844 S.E.2d at 735
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proving viciousness.101 Accordingly, the court held the statute
constitutional.102 Notably, in so doing the court either overruled or
limited a series of Georgia Court of Appeals cases suggesting an owner’s
knowledge was irrelevant when a plaintiff could prove a dog was
unlawfully unleashed or not at heel at the time of the incident. 103
B. Life Itself Is Never an Injury?: Norman v. Xytex Corporation
What happens when a sperm donor isn’t the person you thought he
was and the sperm bank either knew or should have known it? In
Norman v. Xytex Corp.,104 the Georgia Supreme Court clarified its refusal
to allow actions for wrongful birth: while claims “arising from the very
existence of the child are barred, . . . claims arising from specific
impairments caused or exacerbated by [a defendant’s] alleged wrongs
may proceed.”105
Norman’s facts should give pause to any sperm bank patron. The
plaintiffs purchased sperm from the defendant, a sperm bank. The sperm
donor was held out by the sperm bank as one of its best donors, a Ph.D.
candidate with a 160 IQ and no criminal or mental health history. The
defendant further represented that it carefully screened donors;
confirmed the accuracy of donors’ information; required donors to provide
medical updates; and informed purchasers of any new and medically
significant information.106
According to the plaintiff’s allegations, the defendant performed very
little screening on the sperm donor and even encouraged him to
exaggerate his education and IQ. As it turned out, the donor in question
had no higher education degrees, a substantial arrest record, a history of
hospitalization for mental illness, and diagnoses of psychotic
schizophrenia and narcissistic personality disorder. 107
Sadly, the plaintiffs’ child conceived with the purchased sperm
suffered from several physical and mental conditions, including an
inheritable blood disorder. He suffered from suicidal and homicidal
ideation that required extended hospitalization, regular therapy, and
several medications, including anti-psychotic medications.108

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 123, 844 S.E.2d at 735–36.
Id. at 123–24, 844 S.E.2d at 736.
Id. at 123, 844 S.E.2d at 735 n.6.
310 Ga. 127, 848 S.E.2d at 835 (2020).
Id. at 128, 848 S.E.2d at 837.
Id. at 128, 848 S.E.2d at 837.
Id. at 128–29, 844 S.E.2d at 837–38.
Id. at 129, 844 S.E.2d at 838.
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Upon learning through internet searches about the real attributes of
the sperm donor in question, the plaintiffs brought suit on a variety of
theories sounding in both tort and contract. The defendant argued the
plaintiffs’ claims were essentially “wrongful birth” claims barred under
Georgia common law as violative of the public policy. With one exception,
the trial court agreed, finding that the claims were for “wrongful birth
camouflaged as some other tort.”109 Relying on the Georgia Supreme
Court’s opinions in Etkind v. Suarez,110 and Atlanta Obstetrics &
Gynecology Group v. Abelson,111 the Georgia Court of Appeals agreed
with the trial court and affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims. 112
The Georgia Supreme Court held that the court of appeals read
Abelson too broadly.113 The court agreed with the core principle of
Abelson: namely, damages that categorize life as the injury are not
cognizable.114 Therefore, to the extent the plaintiffs’ claims “depended on
life as an injury,” the claims were properly dismissed.115
However, the court also turned to a line of cases recognizing that some
injuries that predate a child’s birth 116—even a child’s conception117—are
compensable, because they do not depend on characterizing the child’s
life as an injury. It then determined that some of the plaintiffs’ damages
did not necessarily rely on the characterization of life itself as the legal
injury.118 For example, the defendant’s alleged failure to update the
plaintiffs on medically significant information concerning the sperm
donor may have exacerbated pain and other symptoms suffered by the
child; indeed, some of these symptoms might have been mitigated had
the plaintiffs known the truth about the donor’s medical history. 119
Similarly, some of the defendant’s misrepresentations may have lead the
plaintiffs to pay more for the sperm than it was really worth. 120

109. Id. at 129–30, 848 S.E.2d at 838.
110. 271 Ga. 352, 519 S.E.2d 210 (1999).
111. 260 Ga. 711, 398 S.E.2d 577 (1990).
112. Norman, 310 Ga. at 129–30, 848 S.E.2d at 838 (describing ruling of court of
appeals).
113. Id. at 138, 848 S.E.2d at 844.
114. Id. at 132–33, 848 S.E.2d at 840.
115. Id. at 133, 848 S.E.2d at 841.
116. Id. at 135, 848 S.E.2d at 842 (citing cases allowing causes of action for prenatal
injuries).
117. Id. at 134–35, 848 S.E.2d at 841–42 (citing McAuley v. Wills, 251 Ga. 3, 303 S.E.2d
258 (1983) (recognizing duty of care owed to unconceived child)).
118. Id. at 135, 848 S.E.2d at 842.
119. Id. at 136–37, 848 S.E.2d at 843.
120. Id. at 137–38, 848 S.E.2d at 843–44. The fact that the court was willing to say this
is somewhat astonishing, given its prior claim that life is never an injury. The child, who
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One can only speculate about why the court granted review in
Norman. A broad interpretation of the bar on actions for wrongful birth
and the claim that life is never a legal injury provides far too much
protection for negligent and even reckless actors in the sperm bank
business. In addition to the goal of compensating plaintiffs for injuries,
tort law aims to shape behavior and, like the criminal law, to deter bad
behavior. The court’s thread-the-needle ruling in Norman may have the
practical effect of encouraging due care by sperm banks.
C. Premises Liability and the Duty to Protect Apartment Complex
Visitors from Third-Party Criminal Attacks: Cham v. ECI
Management Corporation
The premises liability issue in Cham v. ECI Management
Corporation,121 appears fact-driven and simple: was there evidence
presented that would justify a jury instruction on the duty owed by a
landowner to licensees?122 Although three justices dissented, the Georgia
Supreme Court’s answer to the fact-specific question was simple: in the
case in question, there was evidence from which a jury could conclude the
entrant to land was a licensee, so a jury instruction was appropriate.123
For those beyond the immediate parties to the litigation, however, the
principal value of the case lies in its clarification of the differing roles
played by § 44-7-15124 and § 51-3-1.125
Cham is a wrongful death case. The decedent was the victim of a thirdparty criminal attack in the parking lot of an apartment complex. His
surviving spouse and the administrator of his estate sued the owner and
manager of the apartment complex, alleging negligence in failing to
safeguard the parking lot against criminal activity. The decedent was
living with a woman in the apartment complex but was not a signatory
to the lease. At the close of evidence at trial, the trial court instructed the
jury on the different duties possessors of land owe to invitees, licensees,
and trespassers. The plaintiff objected, arguing that the decedent was
either an invitee or a trespasser and that there was no evidence he was
a licensee. Ultimately, the jury ruled for the defendants. On appeal, the

will probably read the opinion someday, will hear from the court that although his life isn’t
an injury, his parents overpaid for the sperm with which he was conceived. Yikes.
121. 311 Ga. 170, 856 S.E.2d 267 (2021).
122. Id. at 170, 856 S.E.2d at 269.
123. Id. at 182–83, 856 S.E.2d at 277.
124. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-15 (2021).
125. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 (2021).
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court of appeals held the instruction on the duty owed to licensees was
warranted by the evidence.126
The Georgia Supreme Court agreed that the instruction was
warranted by the evidence, but its reasoning is far more significant than
was its ultimate conclusion.127 First, the court drew a clear line between
a landlord’s liability under § 44-7-14128 and § 51-3-1.129 O.C.G.A.
§ 44-7-14 governs a landlord’s liability for injuries that take place in a
tenant’s premises, providing:
Having fully parted with possession and the right of possession, the
landlord is not responsible to third persons for damages resulting from
the negligence or illegal use of the premises by the tenant; provided,
however, the landlord is responsible for damages arising from
defective construction or for damages arising from the failure to keep
the premises in repair.130

In contrast, O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-1 to 51-3-3, which provide the general
rules regarding a landowner’s liability to invitees, licensees, and
trespassers, apply when a visitor’s injury takes place in a common area—
say, a parking lot—where the landlord retains possession and control of
the land.131
The court next clarified the decisional law within the state. 132 It
ultimately concluded that for injuries within a tenant’s premises
(O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14), any visitor present by the tenant’s express or
implied invitation is owed the same duty the tenant is owed: in short, the
duty owed to a tenant’s visitor to the leasehold is derivative of the duty
owed to the tenant.133 In contrast, for injuries that take place in common
areas (O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-1 to 51-3-3), the tenant’s visitor does not step into
the tenant’s shoes; rather, the landlord’s duty derives from the
relationship between the visitor and the landlord. 134 That relationship
may be invitee (mutual purpose achieved), licensee (permission but no
mutual benefit), or trespasser. 135 The court’s conclusion about the jury
charge in the case at hand followed naturally from this distinction:
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129.
130.
131.
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Id. at 171–73, 856 S.E.2d at 269–71 (describing ruling of court of appeals).
Id. at 184, 856 S.E.2d at 278–79.
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 (2021).
Cham, 311 Ga at 177, 856 S.E.2d at 274 (citing O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 (2021)).
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14.
Cham, 311 Ga. at 176, 856 S.E.2d at 273.
Id. at 177–79, 856 S.E.2d at 273–75.
Id. at 178, 856 S.E.2d at 274.
Id. at 179–80, 856 S.E.2d at 275.
Id. at 173–74, 856 S.E.2d at 271–272.
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because there was at least some evidence the decedent was there with
the landlord’s implicit permission, a jury instruction on the duty owed
licensees was necessarily appropriate.136
In a dissent joined by two other justices, Justice Peterson asserted that
if the tenant had authority from the landlord to host her guest, then the
guest was an invitee on common areas; if the tenant had no such
authority, the guest was a trespasser. 137 Landlords naturally benefit
from allowing tenants to host guests: restrictions on having guests will
cause potential renters to “pass the property by and rent from a different
landlord who offers more freedom,” which ultimately could reduce the
amount the landlord can receive in rent.138 Given that, “a landlord who
allows a renter to host guests in the rented property generally stands to
benefit financially from that arrangement,” and accordingly, such guests
are invitees both in the leased premises and in the common areas of the
apartment complex.139 If a landlord does not permit tenants to host
guests, then guests are necessarily trespassers, at least absent explicit
permission from the landlord. The dissent determined there was no
evidence of such permission here, so the jury instruction on licensees was
inappropriate.140
Who has the better argument? First, for those who are critical of the
distinctions in legal duties owed invitees and licensees, Cham serves as
Exhibit A: why should the decedent be entitled to less protection merely
because he may have been allowed on the premises without any direct
benefit to the landlord? Second, the dissent’s point is powerful: landlords
have an economic interest in allowing tenants to have guests. Given that
guests must typically enter common areas before they arrive at a tenant’s
apartment, it makes little sense to say the landlord is not benefited by a
guest’s entrance to or use of a common area. The dissent is correct.
D. Proximate Cause and “Color of Employment”: Johnson v. Avis Rent A
Car System, LLC
No torts update could be complete without a riff on proximate cause,
so last, but definitely not least, there’s Johnson v. Avis Rent A Car
System, LLC,141 which played a starring role in the 2021 Intrastate Moot

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 183–84, 856 S.E.2d at 277–79.
Id. at 185–86, 856 S.E.2d at 279–80 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 185, 856 S.E.2d at 279.
Id.
Id. at 186, 856 S.E.2d at 279.
311 Ga. 588, 858 S.E.2d 23 (2021).
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Court Competition among Georgia law schools. 142 This case reaffirmed
Georgia’s pinched interpretation of proximate cause doctrine as applied
to accidents caused by car thieves and clarified its unusual doctrine
regarding acts done under color of employment.143
In Johnson, an employee of a rental car company stole a car after hours
and, a few hours later, got into a high-speed chase with law enforcement
and ultimately crashed into a wall. The plaintiffs in Johnson and its
companion case were sitting on the wall and were seriously injured in the
crash. They sued Avis and several related actors, including the specific
rental location’s operator, for direct negligence regarding policies and
practices that enhanced the risk of theft as well as for negligent hiring
and entrustment. As to the direct negligence claim, the defendants
asserted that the employee’s conduct was an independent intervening
cause that severed the chain of proximate cause and therefore shielded
the defendants from liability for the plaintiffs’ injuries. As to the
negligent hiring and entrustment claims asserted by one of the plaintiffs,
the defendants argued that, at the time of the accident, the employee was
not acting under color of employment as required for recovery. The trial
court rejected these arguments, but the Georgia Court of Appeals agreed
with the defendants.144 The Georgia Supreme Court agreed to review the
case and ultimately affirmed the decisions of the court of appeals. 145
Courts throughout the country disagree about whether vehicle owners
can be liable when the owners are negligent in securing their cars (say,
by leaving keys in the ignition) and car thieves subsequently cause
accidents. For example, courts in Tennessee have held that the juries
may consider whether a car thief’s erratic driving, and subsequent
accident was reasonably foreseeable to an owner who negligently failed
to secure her automobile.146 Courts ruling in that manner have
recognized that proximate cause and the foreseeability of intervening
acts are typically jury questions, so the courts are unwilling to rule that
the theft, poor driving, and accident are unforeseeable as a matter of law.
As Johnson demonstrates, Georgia courts have consistently fallen on
the other side of the doctrinal divide. In Georgia, a vehicle owner is
virtually never liable when a thief steals the car, drives badly, and causes

142. Id. at 589, 858 S.E.2d at 27. Shout out to Mercer Law student and Law Review
Student Writing Editor, Douglas E. Comin, winner of Best Oralist in the 2021 Intrastate
Moot Court Competition.
143. Smith v. Avis Rent A Car System, LLC was the companion case. Id. at 588, 858
S.E.2d at 23.
144. Id. at 588–93, 858 S.E.2d at 26–30 (describing rulings by court of appeals).
145. Id. at 589, 858 S.E.2d at 27.
146. McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767 (Tenn. 1991).

262

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

an accident. This is true regardless of how careless the owner was in
securing the vehicle: keys in the car, ignition running, you name it. Both
the Georgia Court of Appeals and Georgia Supreme Court find the
intervening acts unforeseeable as a matter of law.147
Johnson does not represent a deviation from that trend. To be
foreseeable, an act or consequence must be more than merely possible: it
must be probable.148 In Johnson, the supreme court concluded that even
assuming the theft itself was foreseeable, the thief’s erratic driving and
willingness to flee from law enforcement was not foreseeable. 149 The
plaintiffs had pointed to only a very few high-speed chases based on car
thefts from Avis facilities nationwide and none from the facility in
question.150 Absent more specific evidence about the likelihood of a highspeed chase, the court considered the intervening behavior unforeseeable
as a matter of law.151 However, the court clarified that a reasonably
foreseeable consequence need not be the usual result of the negligent act
at issue, but simply a probable result. 152
The court also held that the employee did not act under color of
employment, and that, therefore, the trial court should have directed a
verdict for the defendants on the plaintiffs’ claims for negligent hiring
and entrustment.153 The color of employment doctrine is distinct from the
more familiar “scope of employment” doctrine in respondeat superior
cases.154 When employees are acting within the scope of employment,
employers are vicariously liable for employees’ actions.155 However, most
intentional torts and most reckless behavior—car theft and reckless
driving of a stolen car—necessarily fall outside the scope of
employment.156 So the question in many Georgia negligent hiring and
entrustment cases, especially ones in which the employee engages in
criminal conduct that an employer should have anticipated, is whether
the defendant acted under color of employment. 157 If he did not, the
employer cannot be liable.158
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Johnson, 311 Ga. at 592, 858 S.E.2d at 29.
Id. at 592, 858 S.E.2d at 29.
Id. at 593–95, 858 S.E.2d at 30–31.
Id. at 595–97, 858 S.E.2d at 31–32.
Id. at 596–97, 858 S.E.2d at 31–32.
Id. at 597, 858 S.E.2d at 32 n. 14.
Id. at 601, 858 S.E.2d at 35.
Id. at 598, 858 S.E.2d at 33.
Id. at 599, 858 S.E.2d at 33.
Id. at 600–01, 858 S.E.2d at 35.
Id. at 599–600, 858 S.E.2d at 34.
Id.

2021

TORTS

263

The Johnson court clarified the scope of this doctrine, which had never
been carefully defined.159 First, it noted that the doctrine exists to shield
employers from general liability for employees’ tortious conduct. An
employee’s tortious behavior that is outside the scope of employment may
nonetheless fall under color of employment if (a) the employee’s tortious
behavior is directed at someone who has a business or special
relationship with the employer and the tort arises out of that
relationship;160 or (b) the employee commits the tortious acts “in a form
that purports they are done by reason of his employment duties or by
virtue of his employment.”161 Here, the court held that the employee did
not act under color of employment: the employer had no relationship
whatsoever with the plaintiff and the theft was not connected to the
employee’s job duties or accomplished by virtue of his employment
relationship.162 Accordingly, the court affirmed the ruling by the court of
appeals that the defendants were entitled to a directed verdict on any
negligent hiring and entrustment claims. 163
What to make of this opinion? As to the proximate cause issue, Justice
Ellington’s dissent gets the last word. After distinguishing existing
Georgia law but also calling prior precedent into question, Justice
Ellington stated simply: “Our courts must do more than pay lip service
to the principle that proximate cause is ‘generally’ or ‘ordinarily’ for the
jury while in practice making it commonplace to take the question of
proximate cause away from a jury.”164 Amen.
As to the color of employment, I question the need for the doctrine at
all. To put it colloquially, this doctrine is a Georgia thing: very few (if
any) other jurisdictions even recognize the concept as a part of claims for
negligent hiring and retention. The court has articulated that the
doctrine is a policy-based limitation on an employer’s liability for an
employee’s tortious behavior. But why is this necessary, given the
doctrine of proximate cause? Proximate cause already acts to shield
defendants from liability for consequences that are remote or
unforeseeable, and I cannot see any additional service this strange color
159. Id. at 598, 858 S.E.2d at 33.
160. Id. at 598–99, 858 S.E.2d at 33.
161. Id. at 599, 858 S.E.2d at 33–34. The supreme court rejected the suggestion that the
thief could not have been acting under color of employment given the fact he was acting
against the employer’s interest. Id. at 601, 858 S.E.2d at 35. As the supreme court
recognized, “in nearly every case of negligent hiring and retention, it is likely the case that
the tortfeasor employee has not acted in the employer’s interest by committing a tort that
leads to the employer being sued.” Id.
162. Id. at 601, 858 S.E.2d at 35.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 601–06, 858 S.E.2d at 35–38.
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of employment doctrine does in the truth and the justice-seeking
universes. Rather than clarifying and applying the doctrine, the Georgia
Supreme Court should have jettisoned it.
IV. THE COVID-19 IMMUNITY STATUTE
The jurisprudence of the Georgia Supreme Court is the overwhelming
focus of this update, but no survey of the 2020–2021 term would be
complete without a nod to Georgia’s COVID-19 Pandemic Business
Safety Act.165 If businesses post certain notices, then patrons to those
businesses are presumed to have assumed the risk of exposure to COVID19.166 The Act will largely exempt businesses from negligence claims
related to COVID-19, but not from claims of gross negligence,
recklessness, or intentional conduct. 167 Even absent this legislation, a
COVID-related negligence claim against a business would have faced
substantial barriers, the most notable being proof of causation. That fact
makes the breadth of the legislation all the more remarkable.
V. CONCLUSION
What do the next years hold for tort law in Georgia? If the 2020–2021
term is any indication, the court will continue to wrestle with issues of
apportionment. In Georgia and elsewhere, courts and legislative bodies
will wrestle with how tort law should apply to injuries caused by selfdriving cars and other new technologies: with the advent of artificial
intelligence, tort law approaches a new frontier.

165. O.C.G.A. §§ 51-16-1 to 51-16-4 (2021).
166. O.C.G.A. § 51-16-3.
167. Id.

